东华大学学报（英文版）2001，Vol.18Issue(4)：119-122,4.
Game Analysis of Rational FRS on Market Admittance
Game Analysis of Rational FRS on Market Admittance
摘要
Abstract
The dynamic signaling game-model is employed to study countermeasures of Q, U and C for supply-demand on financial market. As the game result, the mixed equilibrium of Q and U exists naturally without FRS. It is concluded that FRS on market admittance is objective demand of financial market, also the rational management behavior of government FRSI. And in addition to the empirical criteria, the FRS agreements between FRSI and financial-institutions should be considered as one of advanced FRS techniques. These must cover:① the regulation conformed status investigation with sufficient frequency,② corresponding punitive measures with sufficient strength. Thus the information can be delivered FRSI have ensured only qualified and regulation-conformed financial-institutions could be allowed to enter. That could safeguard the steadiness of the financial market.关键词
Financial Regulation and Supervision (FRS)/Market Admittance/Gamne Analysis/RationalKey words
Financial Regulation and Supervision (FRS)/Market Admittance/Gamne Analysis/Rational分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
曹志东,刘春红,俞自由..Game Analysis of Rational FRS on Market Admittance[J].东华大学学报（英文版）,2001,18(4):119-122,4.基金项目
Funded by National Nature Science Fund (Important Project No. 79790130) （Important Project No. 79790130）
