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Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply ChainOA

Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply Chain

中文摘要英文摘要

With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly correlates wi…查看全部>>

With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly correlates with the incentive compensation coefficient of principal, order quantity of principal and production capability level of the agent. The principal should offer an appropriate incentive contract according to the risk preference of the agent,…查看全部>>

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College of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, P.R.China;College of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, P.R.China;College of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, P.R.China

建筑与水利

supply chain, risk preference, linear-contract, principal-agent theory

supply chain, risk preference, linear-contract, principal-agent theory

《国际设备工程与管理(英文版)》 2007 (3)

智能信息融合图像识别理论及应用研究

148-153,6

The paper is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60372085,60404011 and the Youth Foundation of Northwestern Polytechnical University.

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