首页|期刊导航|国际设备工程与管理（英文版）|Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply Chain
国际设备工程与管理（英文版）2007，Vol.12Issue(3)：148-153,6.
Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply Chain
Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply Chain
摘要
Abstract
With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly correlates with the incentive compensation coefficient of principal, order quantity of principal and production capability level of the agent. The principal should offer an appropriate incentive contract according to the risk preference of the agent, or choose an agent holding a different risk preference to establish the supply chain.关键词
supply chain, risk preference, linear-contract, principal-agent theoryKey words
supply chain, risk preference, linear-contract, principal-agent theory分类
建筑与水利引用本文复制引用
..Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply Chain[J].国际设备工程与管理（英文版）,2007,12(3):148-153,6.基金项目
The paper is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60372085,60404011 and the Youth Foundation of Northwestern Polytechnical University. （）
