中国人口·资源与环境2011，Vol.21Issue(2)：31-35,5.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2011.02.006
政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究
Research about Government Regulation and the Firm Environment Pollution under Perspective of Game Theory
摘要
Abstract
The firms seek profit without taking environmental cost into consideration, which cause serious pollution to the environment.Under such circumstances, the market can not handle the externalities, it is necessary for the government to intervene.Prevailing analysis of game theory fail to take political cost and reputation cost into account, which makes theories can not explain and applied to the real world.Based on defects mentioned above , the author try analyzing with game model, and reach such conclusions: with the government lowering the cost of inspection 、 increasing the fines 、 reducing the related Interest from the polluted firms, which do help alleviate pollution.Furthermore, increasing the firm' s reputation cost and the government political cost play fundamental role in improving the quality of environment.关键词
环境污染/环境监管/博弈分析分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
张学刚,钟茂初..政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(2):31-35,5.基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金课题"生态环境问题成因与治理的政治经济学分析"(编号:09YJA790112) （编号:09YJA790112）
天津市社科项目"天津市完善节能减排长效激励机制研究"(编号:20102411). （编号:20102411）
