同济大学学报（自然科学版）2011，Vol.39Issue(1)：135-138,145,5.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.0253-374x.2011.01.026
基于多任务委托代理的高校协作激励机制设计
Incentive Mechanism Design for University Cooperation Based on Multi-task Principal-agent Theory
摘要
Abstract
The multi-task principle-agent models are presented to study the incentive mechanism between local government and universities. In this model, two main tasks of universities, namely, teaching and research are considered.Mechanisms under three kinds of relationships between the two tasks, namely, independent, substitutable and complementary, are discussed, respectively. The main conclusions are as follows. If the two tasks are complementary, incentives on research can improve teaching level. On the other hand, if the two tasks are substitutable,incentives on research will induce the university to ignore teaching and attach too much attention on research. As a result, the incentive performance will be weakened. To overcome this problem, subjective evaluation and supervision mechanisms are introduced to converting the substitutable relationship to a complementary one. In addition, it indicates that by redesigning incentive mechanisms, the incentive efficiency can be enhanced effectively.关键词
高校协作/多任务/委托-代理/激励机制Key words
university cooperation/ multi-task/ principalagent/ incentive mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
段永瑞,王浩儒,霍佳震..基于多任务委托代理的高校协作激励机制设计 [J].同济大学学报（自然科学版）,2011,39(1):135-138,145,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金(71002020) （71002020）
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(07JC630050) （07JC630050）
上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(09ZS39) （09ZS39）
上海市教育科学研究项目(B07052) （B07052）
