青岛大学学报（自然科学版）2011，Vol.24Issue(1)：84-88,5.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2011.01.018
基于多任务委托-代理模型的IT外包激励机制分析
Incentive Mechanism Model Based on Multi-task Principal-agent for IT Outsourcing
摘要
Abstract
Based on the principal-agent theory, using the multi-task principal-agent model of Holmstrom &Milgrom as an analysis framework, two tasks of the technical effects and the economic benefits of the IT outsourcing project performance were selected to build a multi-task principal-agent model. The issues of IT outsourcing incentive were discussed under two conditions of independent tasks and inter-dependent tasks. Research results show that under the condition of independent tasks, the corporation should enhance the incentive intensity of every task when absolute risk aversion of the vendor is low; Comparison of two tasks, the corporation should enhance the incentive intensity in the task of low change rate of marginal cost when their variance of the observable variables are same, and the corporation should also enhance the incentive intensity in the task of low variance of the observable variables when their change rate of marginal cost are same. And under the condition of inter-independent tasks, the incentive intensity of the economic benefits should be enhanced when the two tasks are complementary,and reduced when substituted.关键词
信息技术外包/激励机制/多任务委托-代理/道德风险Key words
IT outsourcing/ incentive mechanism/ multi-task principal-agent/ moral hazard分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
周波,张嵩..基于多任务委托-代理模型的IT外包激励机制分析[J].青岛大学学报（自然科学版）,2011,24(1):84-88,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金(70601014) （70601014）
山东省自然科学基金(Y2006H01) （Y2006H01）
