浙江大学学报（理学版）2011，Vol.38Issue(2)：150-156,7.DOI:10.3785/j.issn.1008-9497.2011.02.007
工程服务外包中的激励机制和定价策略研究
Incentive mechanism and pricing strategy in engineering service outsourcing
摘要
Abstract
Engineering service outsourcing is an important way for manufacturer to face competition, concentrate on core business and reduce cost. In engineering service outsourcing, there is moral hazard problem because and it is hard the service is offered by supplier to customer directly for the manufacturer to measure the service outcome.Therefore, the manufacturer should build up an incentive mechanism to stimulate the supplier to offer high quality service. This paper studies the optimal incentive mechanism for engineering service outsourcing. By setting up the incentive model based on the model of moral hazard under continuous working performance, the research mainly discusses the following questions: What is the prior condition for the supplier to offer costly effort? What's the optimal incentive mechanism? How does the mechanism vary according to the different degrees of incentive? What is optimal pricing strategy for engineering service outsourcing? etc. The results show that:1)The incentive mechanism is necessary and available just in the service supply chains which comply with certain demand distributions. 2)There is a discontinuous point on the incentive payment curve. 3)The degree of incentive and ratio of profit allocation can be modified through changing the value of the parameters.关键词
工程服务外包/服务供应链/激励机制分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
俞海宏..工程服务外包中的激励机制和定价策略研究[J].浙江大学学报（理学版）,2011,38(2):150-156,7.基金项目
国家社会科学基金资助项目(09CJY072). （09CJY072）
