工业工程2009，Vol.12Issue(5)：31-35,5.
信息不对称下企业集团母子公司管控失效分析
Supervision Invalidation Analysis Resulting from Information Asymmetry in Parent-Subsidiary Companies
摘要
Abstract
In business groups,the control to the subsidiary companies by parent companies is characterized as entrusting and agent relationship. In this relationship,the parent companies are in the inferior position in the sense of information acquisition,leading to information asymmetry. This information asymmetry results in supervision invalidation to the subsidiary companies by parent companies. With this observation,detailed analysis for supervision invalidation of strategy control,finance control,and human resource control is carried out. Based on the analysis,suggestions are proposed to improve the supervision effectiveness.关键词
管控失效/信息不对称/委托代理理论Key words
supervision invalidation/ information asymmetry/ theory of entrusting and agent分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王明照,周洁..信息不对称下企业集团母子公司管控失效分析[J].工业工程,2009,12(5):31-35,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872123) （70872123）
