中国人口·资源与环境2011，Vol.21Issue(8)：142-146,5.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2011.08.023
基于博弈论的非点源污染控制模型探讨
Modeling Nonpoint Source Pollution Control from the View of Game Theory
摘要
Abstract
With the increasing ability to deal with point source pollution, such as industrial and urban life sewage, the impact of agricultural non-point source pollution on water quality environment has become more and more apparent. Compared with point source pollution, non-point source pollution occurs at an uncertain time, in an uncertain way and with uncertain quantity, which brings much more difficulties to the making of some relevant control policies. Beginning with the famous phenomenon of the Tragedy of Commons, this paper analyzes the game situation among the non-point pollution makers based on the marketing game model and the government supervision game model, and then proposes a way to manage and control non-point pollution in the form of "collective performance". Premising with the target of decreasing pollutant discharge, marketing game model proves that it is feasible and efficient to do the trade on point-nonpoint source pollution on the basis of the principle of Optimal Cost, while the results of the government supervision game model show that; a reasonable environment subsidy and punishment mechanism, and government's attaching importance to the self-reputation and public image will play a positive role in promoting non-point source pollution control.关键词
非点源污染/博弈论/公地悲剧/排污权交易/政府监管Key words
nonpoint source pollution/game theory/tragedy of the commons/exchange of pollutant discharge quotas/government supervision分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
张蔚文,刘飞,王新艳..基于博弈论的非点源污染控制模型探讨[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(8):142-146,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70873107). （编号:70873107）
