南方农业学报2011，Vol.42Issue(8)：1025-1028,4.
基于博弈论视角的绿色信贷参与主体利益分析
Analysis on the interests among the main participants of green credit policy
摘要
Abstract
[Objective]The present studies were performed to analyze the current problems hindering the implementation of green credit policy in order to facilitate the implementation of green credit policy. [Method ]The game theory was used to analyze the interests between bank and enterprise, government and enterprise, and government and bank in the implementation of the green credit policy. Based on the analysis, some suggestions have been put forward. [Kesult]The Nash Equilibrium between government and enterprise was found to be related with the fine imposed by the government upon the polluting enterprises and the supervision and inspection cost paid to the government by them. In other words, the more fine government imposed upon the enterprise, the more probability enterprise treated pollution. The Nash Equilibrium between government and bank was related to the profit and cost of each other. Reduction in cost of supervision and inspection by government and increase in profits of bank through implementing the green credit policy could promote the cooperation between government and bank for implementing green credit policy and improving the socio-economic; and ecological environment. [Suggestion]In order to promote the implementation of green credit policy, some countermeasures have been proposed, which included strengthening the supervision of environmental contamination, offering government subsidies to enterprises for controlling pollution, standardizing other financial methods, formulation of corresponding policies, upgradation of enterprise products, improvement in consciousness and social responsibility of pollution control, etc.关键词
绿色信贷/参与主体/博弈模型/发展对策Key words
green credit/ main participants/ game model/ countermeasures分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
朱丽,于伟咏..基于博弈论视角的绿色信贷参与主体利益分析[J].南方农业学报,2011,42(8):1025-1028,4.基金项目
四川农业大学创新型实验计划项目(00409207) （00409207）
