管理工程学报2011，Vol.25Issue(3)：139-147,9.
外生的隐性“关系”与显性激励
Implicit “Guanxi” and Explicit Incentive
摘要
Abstract
Guanxi is an exogenous and implicit contract that allocates implicit benefits among parties in the game Guanxi network. The magnitude of implicit Cuanxi benefits depends on the effort of parties to maintain their Guanxi. This paper constructs a three-stage model based on the principal-agent framework. The framework asserts that explicit incentive problems are embedded in the process of maintaining Guanxi through exogenous Guanxi contract and implicit benefit.In the three-stage model, we assume that principle and agent are selfish and their ultimate goal is to maximize their own benefits, including implicit Guanxi benefit and explicit economic benefit. The model has the sequential-moving property. Therefore, we employ the concept of sub-game perfect equilibrium. Our analysis results have three major findings. First, parties in the same Guanxi network harmoniously respond to changes in the coefficient of Gguanxi benefits, the sharing coefficient of Gguanxi benefits, and the cost of the principal' s Guanxi actions. Second, an increase in the coefficient of Gguanxi benefits tends to increase the sharing coefficient of explicit performance and expected explicit performance. The cost of an agent' s Guanxi actions increases performance by stimulating the agent to elicit more efforts in producing explicit performance. Third, explicit incentive contracts that address concerns of implicit Guanxi contract have better performance than explicit incentive contracts without.These findings are applicable to explaining unique economic phenomena of Chinese economy and understanding Quanxi as a resource for competitive advantages. The findings of this study help us understand the relationship between implicit Guanxi contact and explicit incentive mechanisms. Research results also enable us to drawn managerial implications, such as the impact of an implicit Quanxi on explicit incentives and economic performance, and unexpected consequences resulted from the ignorance of Guanxi for practitioners in Guanxi-prevailing situations.关键词
关系/合同/关系合同/激励/业绩Key words
guanxi/ contract/ guanxi contract/ incentive/ performance分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
倪得兵,戴春爱,唐小我..外生的隐性“关系”与显性激励[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(3):139-147,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005) （70932005）
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702025) （70702025）
电子科技大学中青年学术带头人培养计划 （）
