管理工程学报2011，Vol.25Issue(3)：48-52,5.
安全压力下制销供应链联盟与消费者的关系
The Relationship between Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Alliance and Consumers under Safety Pressure
摘要
Abstract
Profit optimization decisions usually do not consider product safety responsibility. Although enterprises can enjoy short-term profit, they cannot deliver long-term benefit. The existence of enterprises can be threatened if product safety responsibility problems surface. Therefore, it is important to analyze the relationship between supply chain alliance and consumers under the pressure of product safety and provide important guidance for supply chain partners and consumers.A supply chain model consists of manufacturer, distributor and consumers. We divide manufacturers into two categories "g" and "b". Manufacturers in category "g" fulfill safety responsibilities, whereas manufacturers in category "b" do not. Product safety performance can influence a consumer's preference from the perspective of corporate social responsibility. This paper adopts the game theory to investigate the relationship between manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance and consumers under the pressure of product safety responsibility.First, this paper reviews literature on the profit coordination model for manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance and on the preference of consumers for product safety. The study shows that the consulting price is the result of Nash equilibrium in one-game model, and the profit distribution factor β value is within the acceptable range, and the profit gained after alliance surpasses that before alliance. Therefore, it is a win-win situation for manufacturer and retailer to form an alliance. Second, the paper describes a campaign between a customer organization and a manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance. The results indicate that the safety pressure made in a customer organization's campaign will increase if the resource a is available. This indicates that having a good relationship with manufacturer-retailer alliance will help a customer organization. Third, the paper analyzes the demand of consumer organizations with regard to manufacturer-retailer alliance. The results indicate that the safety pressure on the "g" manufacturer-retailer alliance can be greater than that on the "b" alliance. The "g" alliance has a higher profit than the "b" alliance when the relationship between consumer organizations and manufacturer-retailer alliance is better in the former than in the latter alliance. When profits gained from competition are more than competition cost, companies will choose to compete. This finding indicates that the desire to compete between customer organization and alliance is determined by expected profits.Finally, the paper analyzes a few customer organizations with regard to target manufacturer-retailer alliance. The results indicate that customer organizations will target the " g" manufacturer-retailer alliance. Weak consumer organizations target at the "g" manufacturer-retailer alliance, whereas strong consumer organizations target at the "b" alliance. We conclude this study with important guidelines for both manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance and consumers.关键词
制销供应链联盟/安全责任/消费者组织/安全压力/目标选择Key words
manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance/ safety responsibility/ consumer's organization/ safety pressure- target selection分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
孟炯,唐小我,倪得兵..安全压力下制销供应链联盟与消费者的关系[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(3):48-52,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005) （70932005）
四川省科技支撑计划资助项目(2011FZ0008) （2011FZ0008）
四川循环经济研究中心资助项目(XHJJ-0917) （XHJJ-0917）
