管理工程学报2011，Vol.25Issue(3)：68-72,5.
基于合作溢出的机会主义行为演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Opportunistic Behavior Based on Cooperative Spillover
摘要
Abstract
Enterprises in the market economy and knowledge society are forming strategic alliance with each other in order to obtain necessary skills and capabilities. Strategic alliance opportunities inevitably create opportunistic and self-interest behaviors, thereby resulting in disorderly competition and reduced alliance profit. It is important to learn how to develop a healthy alliance by reducing opportunism behaviors and improving alliance profits. In reality, alliance members tend to take effective supervisory and preventive measures to avoid cooperative spillover of exclusion resource, and reduce or avoid the loss of their own interests. Therefore, research of alliance stability and alliance income should be based on at least two aspects: supervisory and preventive measures, as well as cooperative spillover of exclusion resource.The current research on alliance and opportunism behaviors of alliance members is mainly based on single factor, such as information symmetry, supervision and prevention, external environment, cooperative spillover effect of exclusion resource, trust or culture. Two or more influencing factors were rarely considered at the same time. According to the evolutionary game theory, this paper uses a replicator equation as our basic model to characterize the change of opportunist proportion and mutually beneficial proportion when cooperative spillover occurs. We also analyze evolution laws under stable alliance equilibrium, and potential influence of cooperative spillover on alliance profits.In the first part we construct an alliance system that is created by many individuals. The evolutionary game model is based on exclusion resources that takes opportunist proportion in alliance and mutually beneficial proportion. In the second part, we calculate the stable alliance equilibrium point and study the evolution law of opportunistic behavior according to the Jacobin matrix. Excessive prevention cost can stop cooperative spillover of mutually beneficial cooperation from happening when opportunists dominate alliance systems. A certain amount of cooperative spillover between members can reduce the number of incidences of opportunistic behavior, form good behavior standards in alliance and avoid disorderly competition between members. In the third part, we study the influence of cooperative spillover on opportunist and mutual reciprocity in alliance, and overall benefits of an alliance. Cooperative spillover between alliance members presents changes in the opposite direction with their expected average profit. Excessive cooperative spillover can result in the decrease in revenues of alliance members and overall alliance. Opportunists can dominate an alliance system with much less spillover ( such as zero) . Therefore, it is beneficial to keep certain amounts of spillover for alliance profit. Finally, this model and related propositions and conclusions are verified through an alliance example that is formed by S3 units including steel enterprises, universities and institutes.In summary, effective supervision of opportunistic behaviors of alliance members and cooperative spillover is very important for alliance stability and profit. Government departments should subsidize income loss caused by cooperative spillover for enterprises having exclusion resources. This strategy can help reduce opportunistic behaviors, maintain stable operation of alliance, and improve overall alliance revenues.关键词
合作溢出/机会主义行为/联盟收益/演化博弈Key words
cooperative spillover/ opportunistic behavior/ alliance benefit/ evolutionary game分类
数理科学引用本文复制引用
邢乐斌,王旭..基于合作溢出的机会主义行为演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(3):68-72,5.基金项目
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK100043 （）
CDJRC10010004) （）
