管理工程学报2011，Vol.25Issue(3)：78-84,7.
员工甄别和筛选:基于动机公平偏好隐藏的激励契约研究
Employee Screening and Selection: Incentive Contract Research Based on Rabin Fairness Function under the Condition that Preference is Hidden
摘要
Abstract
The classical contract theory assumes that game players are only concerned with personal interests. However, many experiments indicate that game players also have fairness preferences. Recent behavior contract studies incorporate fairness preference into the classical contract theory. Two kinds of utility function theories describing fairness preference are available. The first is the inequality-aversion theory, such as Fehr and Schmidt utility function, that emphasizes equitable distribution of material gains. The second is the reciprocity theory, such as Rabin utility function, that thinks highly of behavior motivation, and emphasizes returning a favor with a favor. The first theory has been widely used because its application is simple. The second theory is based on the psychological game theory, and more difficult in its applications. This paper adopts Rabin function to study optimum incentive contract on the assumption that an agent' s fairness preference is hidden.Firstly symmetrical information is studied as a benchmark. Under the circumstances of symmetrical information, an agent' s fairness preference is a common knowledge under the condition of symmetrical information. The principle can design the optimum contract according to an agents preference because the optimum contract is type dependent.Under the circumstance of asymmetric information, an agent' s preference is hidden under the condition of asymmetric information. The principle cannot observe an agents preference directly. The principle can only discriminate an agents preference by designing incentive compatible mechanisms. If two types of agents are employed, the optimum contract becomes complicated because it needs to satisfy both incentive compatibility constraint and individual rationality constraint. Therefore, it is impossible to discriminate different agents by designing a contract menu that rewards different agents with different salaries. The conclusion is similar to the findings of Siemens' study ( 2005 ). Although the conclusion is the same, the hypothesis is different. This paper assumes that an agent goes seek motivation fairness or reciprocity. In contrast, Siemens (2005) asserts that the an agent runs favors result fairness or inequality-aversion.If the principle has no time constraints and has abundant agents to choose from, the principle can employ one type of agents and make more profits. The principle can discriminate different agents and screen out unqualified agents because different agents have different individual rationality constraints. Because of the discriminative ability, the principle can completely remove an agent' s information rent.关键词
Rabin公平效用函数/逆向选择模型/信息租金/雇佣Key words
Rabin fairness function/ adverse selection model/ information rent/ employment分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
吴国东,蒲勇健..员工甄别和筛选:基于动机公平偏好隐藏的激励契约研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(3):78-84,7.基金项目
国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY017) （07BJY017）
