吉林大学学报（信息科学版）2011，Vol.29Issue(5)：457-463,7.
委托代理理论的物流公司装卸工人激励机制
Principal-Agent Theory of Logistics Companies Handling Workers' Incentives
摘要
Abstract
For the logistics company's most important human resource-front-line employees incentives for research is relatively small, and the lack of quantitative research. We use multiple principal-agent model to analyze the logistics enterprises there are two types of front-line employees, that is around the network of logistics companies and logistics companies handling workers, transit workers, warehouse outlets handling the incentive problem and come to specific incentives. The results of the logistics enterprises to implement specific incentives have some reference.关键词
物流/装卸工人/激励/委托代理Key words
logistics/ loader/ incentive/ principle-agent分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
冯文财,徐庆,夏青..委托代理理论的物流公司装卸工人激励机制[J].吉林大学学报（信息科学版）,2011,29(5):457-463,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971070) （70971070）
山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2009HM004) （ZR2009HM004）
