电力系统自动化2011，Vol.35Issue(21)：46-51,6.
寡头电力市场中CO2排放规制的微分对策模型
Differential Game Models for CO2 Emission Regulation in Oligopolistic Electricity Market
摘要
Abstract
Given that CO2 emission rights cannot be effectively arranged relying on market mechanisms alone,differential game theory is used to study the regulation of CO2 emission in an oligopolistic electricity market.A Stackelberg differential game model for multilateral competition is proposed.The model can be solved using backward induction and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to obtain the optimal government carbon tax and CO2 emission allowance price,as well as equilibrium sell price and the optimal distribution ratio of emission rights among generation enterprises in the decentralized decision.Meanwhile,the main economic implications of equilibrium solutions are analyzed and the corresponding decision-making revelations are briefly discussed.Using a six-generator electricity market as an example,the simulation results indicate that the differential game equilibrium is the Pareto improvement of the cases when government makes optimal control unilaterally without considering generation enterprises＇ rational responses. This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China（No.90510016,No.70903080） and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China（No.CDJXS10020004）.关键词
CO2排放/政府规制/Stackelberg微分对策/反馈纳什均衡/节能减排/电力市场Key words
CO2 emission/government regulation/Stackelberg differential game/feedback Nash equilibrium/energy saving and emission reducing/electricity market分类
数理科学引用本文复制引用
黄守军,任玉珑,俞集辉,韩维建..寡头电力市场中CO2排放规制的微分对策模型[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(21):46-51,6.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目 （）
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目 （）
