南京工业大学学报：社会科学版2011，Vol.10Issue(4)：64-68,5.
两级供应链中的通道费契约研究
Research on Contracts of Slotting Allowances in a Two-echelon Supply Chain
摘要
Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical model on slotting allowance in the supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers. This model is developed on the basis of four conditions ： no-slotting allowance, lumpsum slotting allowance, linear slotting allowance with fixed amounts, and linear slotting allowance without fixed amounts. It is found that the fixed slotting allowance doesnt influence the final product price and quantity. In essence, slotting allowance is one part of the profits obtained by retailers from the supplies through the market power they process. Finally, the variance of retail and wholesale prices brought by the change of market scale is much greater than that brought by the change of slotting allowance ratio. The bigger market scale a retail enterprise possesses, the more profits it will obtain when the slotting allowance model is taken. Fixed slotting allowance makes it possible for retailers to earn more profits from suppliers.关键词
供应链/通道费/多阶段博弈/纳什均衡Key words
supply chain/slotting allowance/multi-stage game/Nash equilibrium分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
赵麟,李卫红..两级供应链中的通道费契约研究[J].南京工业大学学报：社会科学版,2011,10(4):64-68,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目 （）
江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目 （）
