运筹与管理Issue(6)：210-215,6.
基于演化博弈的建筑工程安全监管研究
Research on Construction Safety Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
摘要
Abstract
Based on the assumption that both the construction enterprise and supervision department have bounded rationality, the interaction mechanism and stable state between the safety production strategy of construction enterprise and the supervision strategy of supervision department is analyzed with evolutionary game theory in this paper. A numerical example is given for construction enterprise and the strategy that enterprise and supervision department will chose is discussed. The results demonstrate that the stable state of construction safety supervision is related to certain key factors including cost of regulatory procedures, probability of accidents, loss of construction enterprises resulted from accidents, cost of safety supervision and penalty strength. Based on the analysis, several effective measures for construction safety supervision are presented.关键词
安全监管/安全生产/演化博弈/建筑工程Key words
safety supervision/ safety production/ evolutionary game/ construction engineering分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
程敏,陈辉..基于演化博弈的建筑工程安全监管研究[J].运筹与管理,2011,(6):210-215,6.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103119) （71103119）
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC630030) （10YJC630030）
上海大学研究生创新基金项目(SHUCX112080) （SHUCX112080）
