| 注册
首页|期刊导航|中国人口·资源与环境|基于府际博弈的跨行政区流域水污染治理困境分析

基于府际博弈的跨行政区流域水污染治理困境分析

李胜 陈晓春

中国人口·资源与环境2011,Vol.21Issue(12):104-109,6.
中国人口·资源与环境2011,Vol.21Issue(12):104-109,6.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104,2011.12.018

基于府际博弈的跨行政区流域水污染治理困境分析

Governance Dilemma of Trans-district Water Pollution:An Intergovernmental Game Perspective

李胜 1陈晓春1

作者信息

  • 1. 湖南大学政治与公共管理学院,湖南长沙410082
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Water shortages and pollution are main environmental problems in China Influenced by basin' s integrity and fluidity, one administrative region' s basin water pollution can often transfer to another or to more administrative regions. In traditional theory, people thought that the governance dilemma of trans-district water pollution is mainly due to the obstacles of economic growth, industrial structure, environmental enforcement efficienly and management system. In fact .these factors are hard to explain how the trans-district water pollution happens. This paper used game theory to malyze signaling game between the central government and local governments and pollution governance game between upstream and downstream governments in trans-district water pollution governance. The results indicate that because the impact of the asymmetric regional interests and information and the lack of mechanism incentive, the local governments are hard to fulfill the central government's governance policies, while due to the externalities and interest conflicts, each administrative region can't control the pollution alone, and then the unreasonable equilibrium of intergovernmental game became the basic reason of governance dilemma. Effective control the trans-district water pollution must be based on understanding the role and behavior of government. So the central government should reinforce the degree of confidena, improve the level of monitoring and punishment, overcome the interest' s alliance between local governments and polluting enterprises, and through repeated game, establish cooperative governance mechanism between administrative regions.

关键词

府际博弈/跨行政区/流域/水污染

Key words

intergovernmental game/ trans-district/ basin/ water pollution

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

李胜,陈晓春..基于府际博弈的跨行政区流域水污染治理困境分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(12):104-109,6.

基金项目

湖南大学985工程"两型社会创新基地"项目 ()

教育部人文社科青年项目"跨行政区流域水污染协同治理机制研究"(编号:11YJC630104). (编号:11YJC630104)

中国人口·资源与环境

OA北大核心CSSCICSTPCD

1002-2104

访问量0
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文