| 注册
首页|期刊导航|上海管理科学|人力资本投资的资产专用性问题及其防范机制研究

人力资本投资的资产专用性问题及其防范机制研究

尤琳

上海管理科学2011,Vol.33Issue(6):71-74,4.
上海管理科学2011,Vol.33Issue(6):71-74,4.

人力资本投资的资产专用性问题及其防范机制研究

Research on Asset Specificity of Human Capital Investment and Risk-prevention Mechanism

尤琳1

作者信息

  • 1. 海军工程大学理学院,湖北武汉 430033
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The characteristics of incomplete contract and asset specificity which belong to specific human capital investment will inevitably lead to the problem of the lack of incentives from both investors. This article describes the status quo based on the " Prisoner s Dilemma"model of investment in specific human capital*and furtherly establishes specific human capital investment decision-making model from incomplete information static game to dynamic game and unlimited cooperation game. By these models this article finds out the three key points of risk-prevention mechanism that are stable employment relationship, fully authorized incentive and sufficient flow mechanism.

关键词

专用性人力资本投资/资产专用性/敲竹杠/防范机制

Key words

Specific human capital investment/Assetspecificity/ Hold-up / Risk-prevention mechanism

分类

社会科学

引用本文复制引用

尤琳..人力资本投资的资产专用性问题及其防范机制研究[J].上海管理科学,2011,33(6):71-74,4.

上海管理科学

OACHSSCDCSSCICSTPCD

1005-9679

访问量0
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文