管理工程学报2012，Vol.26Issue(1)：1-12,12.
高管权力与公司治理效率——基于国有上市公司高管变更的视角
Executive Power and Effectiveness of Corporate Governance——Evidence from Chief Executive Turnover in State-owned Companies
摘要
Abstract
China is a transitional economy and reforming state-owned enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of chief executives' power on the efficiency of corporate governance from the perspective of chief executive turnover in state-owned enterprises. In our study, we use two categories of composite indicators as the chief executive's proxy indicators for power features and use return on total assets. Operating return on total assets and profit loss status are a company's proxy indicators for operating performance. Based on 4, 121 samples of state-owned companies publicly listed from 2004 to 2008, we find that;(1) Firstly, the logistic regression model shows that a chief executive's position turnover is negatively correlated with a state-owned company's return on total assets and operating return on total assets even though the turnover rate is positively correlated withcompany's loss status on the whole. Meanwhile, the enhanced executive power can reduce the possibility of being forcibly replaced due to the poor performance, indicating that the power of a state-owned company's chief executives play a significant entrenchment role in process of deciding on executive turnover.(2)Secondly, when we use return on total assets and operating return on total assets as the company's proxy indicators for operating performance, a chief executive's turnover can remarkably improve a state-owned company's future operating performance. However, the increased performance only appears after the turnover of chief executives owning smaller power. In comparison, the improvement effect has not been seen in the state-owned company's performance after the position turnover of chief executive holding larger power.(3)Finally, upgrading the state-owned company's administrative level and improving the institutional environment of the company's location can effectively strengthen the mechanism of compulsory replacing chief executives with inferior operating performance. Therefore, the aforementioned factors to a certain degree would inhibit the rent-seeking behavior of state-owned companies' chief executives and raise the company's internal government efficiency.Empirical evidence of this paper reveals that the power's self-serving behavior of a state-owned company's chief executive may interfere with the normal operation of the dynamic incentive mechanism, and adversely affect the efficiency of corporate governance. Research findings can not only help extend Bebchuk, Fried and Wakler's managerial power theory in the dynamic incentive contract level, but also improve our understanding of the economic consequence of the power of state-owned companies' chief executives. Moreover, our findings can help us better understand the policy-making process of state-owned companies' corporate governance and systemic reform of executive selection.关键词
高管权力/公司治理/国有企业/高管变更Key words
chief executive power/corporate governance/state-owned companies/chief executive turnover分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
刘星,代彬,郝颖..高管权力与公司治理效率——基于国有上市公司高管变更的视角[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(1):1-12,12.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172082,70902030) （71172082,70902030）
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10XGL004) （10XGL004）
重庆市软科学研究重点资助项目(CSTC,2010CE0034) （CSTC,2010CE0034）
