管理工程学报2012，Vol.26Issue(1)：131-136,161,7.
价值创造结构、K-重划分与联盟稳定性变化研究
The Structure of Value Creation, K-Partition, and Transformation of Coalition Stability
摘要
Abstract
Value creation is a central concept and provides theoretical perspectives in the entrepreneurship and strategic management literature. Cooperative game theory ( CGT) provides a valuable alternative perspective to study fundamental value creation issues. In contrast to traditional CGT's marginal analysis on added value, this research focuses on the structure of value creation. Structures provide possible frameworks within which participants cooperate, and affect participants' behaviors. We suggest that characteristic functions describe power-distributed structures of value creation and intrinsic properties of coalition stability.We begin with some simple examples that introduce the theoretical setup and propositions. These examples demonstrate some of the subtleties in the way the total value created by coalitions influence their stability. These examples are particularly useful when the coalition is transformed into stable states, where points are connected, and when transformation reaches the edge states.In the section 2, we introduce basic definitions, the formalism of k - partition, and the partition point of cooperative game. We adopt this formalism to identify the maximum value, created by the linear transformation of sub-coalition, and minimum value, created by the coalition to satisfy the condition of core existence.In the section 3, we propose general coalition stability models to derive our results. Our propositions show that there exists a linear transformation between characteristic function structure of the value creation, the minimum value created by the coalition under the condition of core existence, and the maximum value of k - partition is equal to the minimum value. At the edge state of transformation of the coalition's stability, partition points, which are " merger" or " separateness" points of a coalition, do not appear between complementary sets. Where an empty intersection set meets each other, each sub-coalition satisfies no complementarity and linear additivity in value creation. In the section 4, we revisit questions discussed in the preceding examples. We give detail theoretical explanations about how different coalitions reach stable or unstable states, and where " merger" or " separateness" points of coalitionsare distributed.In summary, our results and findings shed lights on a new theoretical perspective for understanding coalition stability and its transformations. The research undoubtedly provides a new direction for researchers to explore organizational boundaries, evolutionary theories, and industry architectures with respect to value creation.关键词
价值创造/结构/特征函数/联盟稳定性Key words
value creation/structure/characteristic function/coalition stability分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
杜义飞,李仕明,陈德富..价值创造结构、K-重划分与联盟稳定性变化研究[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(1):131-136,161,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802009) （70802009）
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(ZYGX2009J109) （ZYGX2009J109）
