| 注册
首页|期刊导航|石家庄经济学院学报|我国上市公司控股股东掏空行为:研究框架与文献述评

我国上市公司控股股东掏空行为:研究框架与文献述评

陈希晖

石家庄经济学院学报2012,Vol.35Issue(2):69-75,7.
石家庄经济学院学报2012,Vol.35Issue(2):69-75,7.

我国上市公司控股股东掏空行为:研究框架与文献述评

Tunneling Activities of Controlling Shareholders of Listed Companies in China:Research Framework & Literature Review

陈希晖1

作者信息

  • 1. 东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096/南京审计学院国际审计学院,江苏南京210029
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Large shareholders controlling is the basic feature of corporate governance of listed companies.The governance of concentrated ownership in listed companies focus on the major shareholders for achieving the "ultra-control benefits" by "tunneling".Large shareholders' tunneling activities has become a common phenomenon in China's listed companies.This paper makes a general review on tunneling concept,theoretical foundation,motivation,approaches,influence factors and the ways to control tunneling activities.Then the further research directions are proposed.

关键词

股东控制/掏空/公司治理

Key words

large shareholders controlling/tunneling/corporate governance/literature review

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

陈希晖..我国上市公司控股股东掏空行为:研究框架与文献述评[J].石家庄经济学院学报,2012,35(2):69-75,7.

基金项目

江苏省教育厅人文社会科学基金资助项目 ()

石家庄经济学院学报

OACHSSCD

1007-6875

访问量0
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文