| 注册
首页|期刊导航|系统管理学报|随机需求条件下供应链的广告合作

随机需求条件下供应链的广告合作

石岿然 何平 肖条军

系统管理学报2011,Vol.20Issue(3):263-268,6.
系统管理学报2011,Vol.20Issue(3):263-268,6.

随机需求条件下供应链的广告合作

Cooperative Advertising in Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

石岿然 1何平 1肖条军2

作者信息

  • 1. 南京工业大学经济与管理学院,南京210009
  • 2. 南京大学工程管理学院,南京210093
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

This paper studies advertising strategy in a two-echelon supply channel with single manufacturer and single retailer. When the market demand is uncertain, the manufacturer's and retailer's optimal advertising strategies of Stackelberg game and Nash cooperative game are investigated, respectively. It is shown that all the advertising level, ordering quantity and system profit when the members choose cooperative strategy are larger than those without cooperation. In Stackelberg game, the manufacturer would provide a potion of retailer's advertising level under a certain condition. Further, the result that cooperative game equilibrium has more Pareto advantage over non-cooperative game equilibrium is presented, and the surplus is distributed by Rubinstein bargaining model. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate and verify the conclusions.

关键词

供应链/合作广告/博弈/讨价还价

Key words

supply chain/cooperative advertising/game/bargaining

分类

经济学

引用本文复制引用

石岿然,何平,肖条军..随机需求条件下供应链的广告合作[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(3):263-268,6.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071075,70671055) (71071075,70671055)

系统管理学报

OACSSCICSTPCD

1005-2542

访问量0
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文