系统管理学报2012，Vol.21Issue(3)：421-427,7.
审计行为、审计合谋及奖惩机制的演化博弈
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Audit Conduct, Audit Collusion and Rewarding/Punishing Mechanism
摘要
Abstract
Audit Collusion is a common phenomenon. An evolutionary game model is established with regard to auditors involved. Auditor's behavior characteristics is analyzed, auditor's behavior evolutionary law and evolutionary stable strategy of rewarding or punishing mechanism using dynamic equations, reward and punishment strategy of avoiding audit collusion is proposed, and the effectiveness of punishment/award mechanism of government is analyzed. A numerical examples provided to illustrate the theoretical analysis.关键词
审计合谋/演化博弈/演化稳定策略Key words
audit collusion/ evolutionary game/ evolutionary stable strategy分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
公彦德,时现..审计行为、审计合谋及奖惩机制的演化博弈[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(3):421-427,7.基金项目
江苏省高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(YSXKKT34) （YSXKKT34）
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BGL010) （10BGL010）
