工业工程2012，Vol.15Issue(2)：33-40,8.
政府不同研发补贴政策下的企业市场绩效
Firm's Market Performance Analysis under Different Government R&D Subsidy Policies
摘要
Abstract
Aiming at the analysis of the effect of government research and development ( R&D) subsidy policies on the firm' s performance in a duopoly market, a three-stage game model is established. The first stage is for the government R&D subsidy situation, including: 1) the government gives the subsidy for the R&D investment of a firm; 2) the government gives the subsidy to encourage a firm for R&D in product innovation. They are called the first and second subsidy policies. In this stage, the government determines the R&D subsidy rate to maximize the total social welfare. The second stage models the R&D cooperation between enterprises and the enterprises determine the R&D level to maximize the total profit. The third stage is for product competition and the enterprises determine the output level to maximize their profit. Bascd on the model, by means of backward induction, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium solutions under R&D cartel strategy are acquired. It shows that, when the cartel R&D strategy is applied, the government subsidy rate resulting from the second policy is much greater than that resulting from the first policy. Thus, the second R&D subsidy policy is superior to the first one, for it makes the firms to invest less but create more output, profit, and social total welfare.关键词
古诺竞争/研究与开发/政府研究与开发补贴Key words
Cournot competition/ research and development (R&D) / government R&D subsidy分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
方海燕,达庆利,朱长宁..政府不同研发补贴政策下的企业市场绩效[J].工业工程,2012,15(2):33-40,8.基金项目
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(09SJD630030) （09SJD630030）
