华东交通大学学报2012，Vol.29Issue(3)：98-102,5.
信息对称及不对称下逆向供应链的激励机制研究
Research on Incentive Mechanism of Reverse Supply Chain under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
王静1
作者信息
- 1. 华东交通大学现代教育技术中心,江西南昌330013
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
This paper establishes an incentive game model between manufacturers and retailers of the supply chain based on principal-agent theory. It relaxes the assumption that remanufacturing products can be complete ly sold and uses the logarithmic relationship to describe the recovery functionary. Then it finds effect of differ ent parameters on the efforts degree of retailers in symmetric information situation and the manufacturer's coef ficient of linear excitation function expression in the case of information asymmetry. . The research shows that in the case of asymmetric information, the retailer's optimal effort is less than that in symmetric information sit uation. The retailer not only gains fixed income, the risk premium of the manufacturer, but also bears the corre sponding risk.关键词
不对称信息/逆向供应链/激励机制Key words
asymmetric information/reverse supply chain/incentive mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王静..信息对称及不对称下逆向供应链的激励机制研究[J].华东交通大学学报,2012,29(3):98-102,5.
