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突发危机事件中群体性事件产生的动态博弈分析

刘尚亮 沈惠璋 李峰 张聪

系统管理学报2012,Vol.21Issue(2):201-205,5.
系统管理学报2012,Vol.21Issue(2):201-205,5.

突发危机事件中群体性事件产生的动态博弈分析

The Dynamic Game Analysis on Cause of Unexpected Mass Incident in Emergency

刘尚亮 1沈惠璋 1李峰 1张聪1

作者信息

  • 1. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Taking into account the psychology of responsibility-sharing of group members, we construct a two-stage dynamic game model under government supervision. The analysis indicates that government supervision, punishment and the psychology of responsibility-sharing are not only the major factors leading to unexpected mass incident, but also are the key elements determining individual's participation as first mover or follower in unexpected mass incident. Punishment and supervision are effective means of control over unexpected mass incident and optimal government supervision proves to be capable of minimizing the social impact of unexpected mass incident and preventing them from further spreading out.

关键词

群体性事件/责任分担心理/政府监管/动态博弈模型

Key words

unexpected mass incident, psychology of responsibility-sharing, government supervision, dynamic game model

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

刘尚亮,沈惠璋,李峰,张聪..突发危机事件中群体性事件产生的动态博弈分析[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(2):201-205,5.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金资助项目(70671066) (70671066)

高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20070248054) (20070248054)

系统管理学报

OACSSCICSTPCD

1005-2542

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