系统管理学报2012，Vol.21Issue(4)：452-460,9.
基于债转股的企业并购支付方式的博弈
The Game of Payment Methods in Merge and Acquisition with Debt-to-equity Swap
摘要
Abstract
We use learning theory of games and build a model to analyze the payment methods in merge and acquisition with debt-to-equity swap, based on the framework of bounded rationality and asymmetric information. It can be seen from the proposed model, that the merger can affect and control the judgments of outside investors and target enterprise which relate to the risk of breakdown. At the same time, the merger should control the rate of the proportion of equity financing and the rate of debt to equity. In this way, the merger can pay the merge and acquisition transaction by using these features to get its own optimal interest in the negotiation.关键词
有限回合/信息不对称/破裂风险/并购支付/债转股/博弈学习理论Key words
limited rounds/asymmetric information/bankruptcy risk/payment method/debt-to-equity swap/learning theory of gamesa分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
周媛媛,李帮义..基于债转股的企业并购支付方式的博弈[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(4):452-460,9.基金项目
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BGL010) （10BGL010）
教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(09YJA630064) （09YJA630064）
