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横向监督中基于社会偏好匹配的员工组合问题研究

王艳梅 赵希男

运筹与管理2012,Vol.21Issue(3):227-235,9.
运筹与管理2012,Vol.21Issue(3):227-235,9.

横向监督中基于社会偏好匹配的员工组合问题研究

The Study on Employee Combination within Horizontal Monitoring Based on Social Preference Matching

王艳梅 1赵希男1

作者信息

  • 1. 东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

There are three kinds of employee combination when horizontal monitoring exists in a corporation; grouping employees of different social preference, grouping workers of high social preference and grouping workers of similar social preference. These will be defined respectively as a homogeneous combination, heterogeneous combination and double-high combination. Based on principal-agent theory, the optimal combination considering employee' social preference information is studied. The model presents the equilibrium outcomes under different conditions. According to the equilibrium outcomes, some conclusions are founded: 1, When horizontal monitoring exists, the employee' efforts and corporation's income are always higher than those without horizontal monitoring. But different combinations have a the same effects on the employee' efforts; 2, Heterogeneous combination can increase corporation total benefits through caving salaries for employees indirectly, but the double-high combination can increase corporation total benefits directly through obtaining more efforts from employees, and heterogeneous combination and double-high combination are always better than homogeneous mix. 3, employee' social preference and the risk-costs are key factors of selecting combination way; The corporation should choose heterogeneous combination when risk-costs are very small and preference's gap between employees is greater; the corporation should choose the double-high combination when risk-costs are very great or when risk-costs are very small and preference's gap between employees is smaller. So to maximize the incentive effects of the horizontal monitoring, the corporation should choose an appropriate combination way according to the employee' personality.

关键词

横向监督/道德风险/员工组合/激励效应

Key words

horizontal monitoring/ moral hazard/ employee combination/ incentive effect

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

王艳梅,赵希男..横向监督中基于社会偏好匹配的员工组合问题研究[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(3):227-235,9.

基金项目

教育部博士点新教师基金资助项目(200801451043) (200801451043)

中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20100481194) (20100481194)

中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N100406009) (N100406009)

运筹与管理

OA北大核心CHSSCDCSCDCSSCICSTPCD

1007-3221

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