运筹与管理2012，Vol.21Issue(3)：242-249,8.
政府引导下的逆向供应链契约设计
The Contract Design of Reverse Supply Chain under the Government Guidance
摘要
Abstract
Using the display principle of agent theory and the screening game theory, we discuss the contract design problem of the reverse supply chain under asymmetric information. We build a decision-making model and obtain the manufacturer's contract design strategies which provide for the retailers in the three different models; the government does not participate in the reverse supply chain, the government implements award policy to retailers and the government implements incentive-punished policies to retailers. The comparative analysis of the three kinds of the contract shows that when the government implements award policy to the retailers, the manufacturer can pay less. At this moment the contract which the manufacturer provides is the most favorable.关键词
逆向供应链/激励机制/契约设计/政府引导/不对称信息Key words
reverse supply chain/ incentive mechanism/ contract design/ government guidance/ asymmetric information分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
贡文伟,李虎,梅强..政府引导下的逆向供应链契约设计[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(3):242-249,8.基金项目
国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL025) （10CGL025）
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJA630043) （10YJA630043）
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJB630007) （2011SJB630007）
江苏大学高级专业人才科研启动基金项目(11JDG005) （11JDG005）
