巢湖学院学报Issue(4)：41-44,4.
基于两个代理人下的激励机制设计
DESIGNMENT FOR THE INCENTIVE MECHANISM BASED ON TWO AGENTS
摘要
Abstract
The paper assume two agents for the Study limitations of a principal and an agent, By studying the two agent＂ s incentive mechanism, discover that the agent can effectiveIy improve the level of work effort and the client＂ s income in the case of the introduction of two agents, and the optimization of the mechanism effects depend on external risks faced by agents to the performance of its risk ratio.关键词
委托-代理理论/激励机制/最优线性合同Key words
principal-agent theory/Incentive Mechanism/Optimal linear contract.分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
汪磊,徐荣..基于两个代理人下的激励机制设计[J].巢湖学院学报,2012,(4):41-44,4.基金项目
安徽省教育厅人文社会科学重点资助项目 （）
