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企业内部控制信息披露的博弈分析及其启示

刘焱

沈阳大学学报:社会科学版2012,Vol.14Issue(5):7-10,4.
沈阳大学学报:社会科学版2012,Vol.14Issue(5):7-10,4.

企业内部控制信息披露的博弈分析及其启示

Game Analysis on Information Disclosure of Internal Control and Revelation

刘焱1

作者信息

  • 1. 辽宁大学商学院,辽宁沈阳110036
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

By using the method of game theory,the authenticity of internal control disclosure of listed companies is analyzed from the view of static game with incomplete information based on the Principal-agent Theory.Several factors affect the authenticity of internal control information are found: supervision frequency of regulatory authorities,punishment cost,the cost that listed companies color their internal control information,and the degree of adverse effect when false disclosure of internal control is found by regulatory authorities.Several suggestions are provided for regulating the information disclosure of internal control on listed companies comparing with the relevant laws and regulations in the USA.

关键词

内部控制信息披露/不完全信息/静态博弈

Key words

internal control disclosure/incomplete information/static game

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

刘焱..企业内部控制信息披露的博弈分析及其启示[J].沈阳大学学报:社会科学版,2012,14(5):7-10,4.

基金项目

辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学项目 ()

沈阳大学学报:社会科学版

OACHSSCD

2095-5464

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