管理工程学报2012，Vol.26Issue(4)：31-38,31,9.
公司治理环境、资产配置偏好与利益侵占
Corporate Governance Environment, Asset Allocation Preference and Expropriation
摘要
Abstract
A growing number of studies has shown that although corporations with controlling shareholders can solve the traditional corporate governance problem they will face new principal-agent problems. When ownership and control are separated in the modern corporation, the controlling shareholder has a motive to take other shareholders' interest for himself. Past studies emphasize on diverting cash in related party transactions and capital allocation based on private benefit control. Do they have some relationships? This paper mainly explores the difference in the controlling shareholder's asset allocation behaviors for the private benefit of control and expects to offer a new perspective for the controlling shareholder's agent problem. By constructing a theoretical model, this paper analyzes the relationship between external governance environment, the proportion of the controlling shareholder's shareholding and current assets expropriation. In addition, we analyze the relationship between corporate investment, rate of return on investment and current assets expropriation. Based on theoretical analysis, we conduct an empirical study on several research hypotheses by using the company data listed from 1999 to 2005. Theoretical analysis shows that if current assets expropriation has no effect on corporate optimal investment decision, external governance environment and the proportion of the controlling shareholder's shareholding will restrain the motive for expropriating current assets for self-interest. If current assets expropriation has some effect on corporate optimal investment decision, the level and return of corporate investment can also restrain the motive for expropriating current assets for self-interest. At this time, current assets expropriation may lead to inefficient investment behavior. An empirical study suggests that current assets expropriation has significantly negative correlation with the level of corporate investment, the return of fixed assets investment and the proportion of the controlling shareholder shareholding. The external governance environment shows a positive correlation, but the regression result is not significant. In this paper, theoretical analysis and empirical test results show that the controlling shareholder has different preferences for asset allocation in order to gain self-interest. It also shows that there is a relationship between current assets expropriation and corporate investment. Whether the controlling shareholder prefers current assets expropriation to corporate investment also depends on internal and external governance environment. This paper offers a new perspective for the controlling shareholder's expropriation research and contributes to future study.关键词
公司治理环境/资产配置/流动资产/固定资产/利益侵占Key words
corporate governance environment/ asset allocation/ current assets/ fixed assets/ expropriation分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
徐光伟,刘星..公司治理环境、资产配置偏好与利益侵占[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(4):31-38,31,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100) （70772100）
重庆市软科学研究计划重点资助项目(CSTC,2010CE0034) （CSTC,2010CE0034）
中央高校基本科研业务费重点资助项目(CDJXS11022201) （CDJXS11022201）
