工业工程2012，Vol.15Issue(4)：53-57,5.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2012.04.010
基于委托代理框架双重信息不对称下回收商激励机制
Principal-Agent-Based Recycling Incentive Mechanism with Double Information Asymmetry
摘要
Abstract
A supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a recycler with double information asymmetry is discussed. In such a supply chain, the manufacturer acts as principal and the recycler as agent. In this supply chain, as an agent, the recycler makes a part of investment. The objective is to explore an effective incentive mechanism in the manufacturer's perspective. By using game theory, a new model for this problem is developed by modifying the traditional model of incentive mechanism. With this model, analysis is done. It shows that the investment made by the recycler and its recycling efforts positively correlated, or the more the recycler invests, the more recycling enthusiasm of the recycler can be incited. Also, the recycler with greater recycling capability is willing to bear more risk. Thus, in decision making, the manufacturer should take these factors into account.关键词
逆向选择/道德风险/委托代理理论/激励机制Key words
adverse selection/ moral hazard/ principal-agent theory/ incentive mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
徐红,施国洪,贡文伟..基于委托代理框架双重信息不对称下回收商激励机制[J].工业工程,2012,15(4):53-57,5.基金项目
教育部人文社科基金资助项目(10YJA630043) （10YJA630043）
