工业工程2012，Vol.15Issue(6)：50-56,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2012.06.009
信息不对称下具有损失规避者参与的供应链决策与协调
Decision-Making and Coordination of Supply Chain with Loss-Aversion under Asymmetric Information
摘要
Abstract
A supply chain composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a loss-averse retailer is discussed in this paper. For such a supply chain, market demands are uncertain and it is assumed that the information of agents' attitude towards to the risks is asymmetric. Stackelberg game is used to analyze the agents' behavior under decentralized decision-making, while revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain under centralized decision-making. Then, analysis is done and results show that, under decentral-ized decision-making, the asymmetric information of agents' attitude towards to the risks results in further efficiency loss of the supply chain with respect to "double marginal effect". However, revenue sharing contract can eliminate the influence of asymmetric information so as to improve the loss-averse retailer's op-timal ordering quantity. A numeral study shows that information sharing can obviously increase the agents' expected utilities in the supply chain.关键词
损失规避/信息不对称/供应链协调/收益共享契约Key words
loss aversion/asymmetric information/supply chain coordination/revenue sharing contract分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王勇,朱龙涛..信息不对称下具有损失规避者参与的供应链决策与协调[J].工业工程,2012,15(6):50-56,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872123) （70872123）
