计算机应用与软件2012，Vol.29Issue(12)：61-64,4.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1000-386x.2012.12.018
惩罚因子在重复囚徒困境博弈中的研究
RESEARCH ON PENALTY GENE IN ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME
摘要
Abstract
Aiming at the problem that the parameters of payoff matrix in prisoner' s dilemma game cannot update dynamically, we put forward a prisoner' s dilemma game model with penalty gene, in which the individuals can dynamically modify the parameters of payoff matrix according to its own tactic. The individuals can also update its tactic according to its neighbours' payoff after one round of game. Simulation results show that the penalty gene can efficiently boost the emergency of cooperation tactic. On the other hand, we also find that the emergency of the cooperation tactic is not related to the penalty gene only but also to initial tactics of the individuals of network. When the individuals in the community adopt the same tactics but different communities adopt different tactics, the cooperation tactics are more tend to come forth. At last, the penalty gene can also promote the average payoffs of players.关键词
囚徒困境/博弈理论/惩罚因子/复杂网络Key words
Prisoner's dilemma/Game theory/Penalty gene/Complex network分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
杨文潮..惩罚因子在重复囚徒困境博弈中的研究[J].计算机应用与软件,2012,29(12):61-64,4.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(60904048). （60904048）
