浙江大学学报（理学版）2013，Vol.40Issue(2)：146-151,6.DOI:10.3785/j.issn.1008-9497.2013.02.006
三方非对称进化博弈行为分析
A behavior analysis of evolutionary game under three asymmetric parties
摘要
Abstract
With the increase of the fields that the government involves and social cooperation negotiating, there are more and more evolutionary games under three asymmetric parties. But there is little research about this kind of game at home and abroad. This is clearly not conductive to properly explain and predict real-life behaviors of three asymmetric evolutionary game. Because of this, based on the strategic adjustment process, this paper establishes the dynamic equations of 2×2×2 asymmetric evolutionary game and classifies qualitative property to analyse behaviors of the three asymmetric parties. We give stable strategies of the three parties under different circumstances. At the same time, we use three-dimensional figures to show the results. This paper has a certain significance to analyse the game behaviors of three asymmetric parties.关键词
进化博弈论/复制动态/进化稳定策略/三方参与主体Key words
evolutionary game theory/strategic adjustment process/evolutionary stable strategy/three asymmetric parties分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
魏芳芳,陈福集..三方非对称进化博弈行为分析[J].浙江大学学报（理学版）,2013,40(2):146-151,6.基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJAZH006). （10YJAZH006）
