湖南大学学报（自然科学版）2013，Vol.40Issue(4)：104-108,5.
基于委托代理理论的突破性技术创新激励机制研究
Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Breakthrough Innovation Based on the Principal-agent Theory
摘要
Abstract
This paper proposes a framework of the incentive mechanism of innovation.The "bandit problem" is embedded into the principal agent model to study the incentive mechanism of radical innovation and incremental innovation.The study finds that the optimal contract that implements radical innovation rewards long-term success,but not short-term success.On the contrary,it may even reward short-term failure.In addition,incentive mechanism of radical innovation also includes persistent commitment to a long-term incentive plan,and timely feedback on performance.Specific measures include "golden parachute",managerial entrenchment,and legal protection of bankruptcy that is benefit for debtors,etc.关键词
委托代理理论/突破性/技术创新/激励/机制Key words
principal agent theory/ radical/ technology innovation/ incentive/ mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
游达明,钟士宇,马北玲..基于委托代理理论的突破性技术创新激励机制研究[J].湖南大学学报（自然科学版）,2013,40(4):104-108,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金创新群体项目(70921001/G0104) （70921001/G0104）
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172100) （71172100）
湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(11JJ5050) （11JJ5050）
