吉林大学学报（信息科学版）2013，Vol.31Issue(4)：425-431,7.
基于锦标制度的供应链激励机制研究
Study on Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain Based on Rank-Order Tournaments
李雷1
作者信息
- 1. 西南财经大学高级工商管理教育中心,成都610075
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
The principal-agent relationship can be found between core-enterprise and its supplier.When the core enterprise owns more than one supplier running the same business,the influence among suppliers constrains the efficiency of the supply chain,the same problem can also be generated by asymmetric information,moral hazard and factors like those.Therefore,simply treating suppliers as a whole definitely,the most effective incentive mechanism can not be designed.Under the frame of rank-order tournaments,with the factors of interrelationship among suppliers taken into consideration,a model with one principal and three agents is analyzed.Because suppliers in different ranking have different influence over others,the weights of their interrelationship are also considered.Through the research,the rationality and effectiveness of incenting suppliers via classification and gradation are discussed.关键词
锦标制度/供应链/激励机制/委托代理Key words
rank-order tournaments/ supply chain/ incentive mechanism/ principal-agent分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
李雷..基于锦标制度的供应链激励机制研究[J].吉林大学学报（信息科学版）,2013,31(4):425-431,7.
