计算机应用研究2013，Vol.30Issue(9)：2802-2804,3.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1001-3695.2013.09.061
基于无限重复博弈的P2P网络信任模型研究
Research on trust model based on infinitely repeated games theory in P2P networks
摘要
Abstract
To resolve the security problems in P2P networks,this paper proposed a trust model based on infinitely repeated game theory.Reward and punishment strategy in this paper not only punished the malicious behavior,but also incentivized the cooperation nodes,and the duration of penalty was determined in the times of fraudulent conduct.Mathematic analysis and simulation experiments show that the strategy of cooperation will be Pareto optimal strategy,which can punish and stifle availably malicious behavior,and improve incentives of the nodes trading honestly,then the security and stability of the P2P network environment will be enhanced efficiently.关键词
P2P网络/信任模型/重复博弈/奖惩策略Key words
P2P networks/ trust model/ repeated game/ incentive strategy分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
王保玉,高承实,戴青,陈景林,刘洋..基于无限重复博弈的P2P网络信任模型研究[J].计算机应用研究,2013,30(9):2802-2804,3.基金项目
国家部委基金资助项目(9140c130103120c13062) （9140c130103120c13062）
