计算机工程Issue(9)：162-166,5.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1000-3428.2013.09.035
基于博弈论的企业信息安全攻防策略研究
Research on Enterprise Information Security Attack-defense Strategic Based on Game Theory
摘要
Abstract
The attack-defense relationship in information security is studied through three game models. The attack and defense equilibrium relationship is discussed with incomplete information dynamic game model, to reach the strategy selection and parameter constraints when the attack and defense relationship getting equilibrium. Taking into account of the long-term and repeatability of the attack and defense relationship, a repeated attack and defense game model under incomplete information is established and long-run equilibrium relationship is reached. Because of the incomplete rationality of decision maker, the limited rationality assumptions is introduced, to verify the validity of the above two models’ conclusion, and getting the effective strategies to solve information security problems with the use of replication dynamic solving evolutionarily stable strategy.关键词
信息安全/攻防关系/不完全信息博弈模型/均衡/重复博弈模型/演化博弈Key words
information security/attack-defense relationship/incomplete information game model/equilibrium/repeated game model/evolution game分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
韩文英,闫明星,柴艳妹,王秀利..基于博弈论的企业信息安全攻防策略研究[J].计算机工程,2013,(9):162-166,5.基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(12YJC630106)；北京市哲学社科规划基金资助项目“首都社会稳定视角下的互联网治理对策研究”(12JGA014)；中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划基金资助项目 （12YJC630106）
