中南民族大学学报（自然科学版）Issue(3)：108-112,5.
跨界流域水污染利益主体博弈分析
Analysis of Transboundary Water Pollution Stakeholders Game
摘要
Abstract
This paper establishes a sequential game model of the upstream and downstream areas .By comparing with or without watershed management institutions comply tax policy and bi-directional compensation mechanism , it validates the importance of effective intervention of the watershed management institutions .The results show that the contradiction between the integrity of river basin and administrative divisions split is the source of the conflict of transboundary water pollution.The key is to straighten out mechanism of the river basin management .关键词
跨界水污染/流域管理机构/序贯博弈Key words
transboundary water pollution/watershed management institutions/sequential game分类
数理科学引用本文复制引用
陈祖海,彭灵敏..跨界流域水污染利益主体博弈分析[J].中南民族大学学报（自然科学版）,2013,(3):108-112,5.基金项目
国家软科学研究计划项目“跨界流域水污染控制协调机制与政策研究” （）
