Product Quality Coordination in Outsourcing with Asymmetric InformationOA
Product Quality Coordination in Outsourcing with Asymmetric Information
SONG Hua-ming;MA Yi-zhong
Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, P.R.ChinaNanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, P.R.China
principal-agent theoryasymmetrical informationcontract designincentive mechanism
principal-agent theoryasymmetrical informationcontract designincentive mechanism
《国际设备工程与管理（英文版）》 2014 (4)
考虑需求信息删失的供应链动态库存控制策略研究
207-211,5
This paper is supported by National Natural Science Fund (No.71172105)
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