财经理论与实践Issue(3)：66-71,6.
内部监督对盈余管理行为的抑制作用研究基于高管变更的视角
Research of Inhibition to Earnings Management of Internal Supervision--Based on the Perspective of Top Executives Replacement
摘要
Abstract
Perfect internal supervision mechanism is usually the key to improve the efficiency of corporate governance.It is useful to restrain the earnings management caused by top executives replacement? We make the research based on the data from 2010 to 2013 Chinese listed company using the multiple regression analysis.The results indicate that top executives replacement causes the decrease of discretionary accruals,and the higher efficiency of the board supervision,the more diligent of the supervisory board,the greater balance of the ownership,can more effectively suppress the decrease of accruals.All of these show that the reasonable internal supervision is useful for a company to weaken managers'misconducts effectively,and to strengthen the con-struction of internal supervision mechanism is the eternal theme of corporate governance.关键词
公司治理/内部监督/高管变更/盈余管理Key words
Corporate governance/Internal supervision/Top executives replacement/Earn-ings management分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈共荣,王慧,谢珊珊..内部监督对盈余管理行为的抑制作用研究基于高管变更的视角[J].财经理论与实践,2015,(3):66-71,6.基金项目
湖南省社科基金项目(2012YBA056)、湖南省科技厅软科学重点课题(2014ZK2051) （2012YBA056）
