城市建筑Issue(30)：166-166,1.
浅析信息不对称下的工程监理激励与监控
Discussion on the Incentive and Monitoring of Engineering Supervision under Asymmetric Information
左剑1
作者信息
- 1. 湖南雁城建设咨询有限公司，衡阳421001
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
In a market economy, information asymmetry uni-versal is common. This phenomenon wil bring certain risks to the interests of both sides, so that both sides are prone to a number of unnecessary conflicts. Therefore, the formulation of incentive and monitoring model of effective engineering sup-ervision plays an important role and has significance to im-prove the conflict situation of both sides caused by information asymmetry.关键词
工程监理/激励/监控/机制/业主Key words
engineering supervision/incentive/monitoring/mechanism/owners引用本文复制引用
左剑..浅析信息不对称下的工程监理激励与监控[J].城市建筑,2014,(30):166-166,1.
