电子学报Issue(12)：2481-2488,8.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.0372-2112.2014.12.021
（2，2）贝叶斯理性秘密共享方案
The (2,2)Bayesian Rational Secret Sharing Sche me
摘要
Abstract
The rational secret sharing is an intersection direction between the traditional secret sharing and game theory .In the rational secret sharing scheme,the selfishness maybe impels rational players to deviate from the protocols so as to influence the fairness of scheme .In the existing threshold rational secret sharing schemes,the fairness of (2,2)rational secret sharing scheme, which is a special case,is hard to be realized,especially implementing on the asynchronous communication channel .To achieve fair-ness of (2,2)rational secret sharing over the asynchronous communication channel,this paper firstly analyzes rational players’utili-ty by simultaneously discussing their short-term interest and long-term interest .Then through illustrating rational players’available actions and belief systems,and computing their expected utilities with the dynamic games of incomplete information,the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for reconstruction phase of (2,2)rational secret sharing is studied.Furthermore,combining with the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)mechanism of design theory,the incentive compatibility mechanism,which is named recording interaction, is designed to restrict the behavior of rational players.Consequently,the fair (2,2)rational secret sharing scheme is presented, which does not need the dealer to keep on-line over the asynchronous communication channel .关键词
理性秘密共享/不完全信息/信念系统/完美贝叶斯均衡/机制设计Key words
rational secret sharing/incomplete information/belief system/perfect Bayesian equilibrium/mechanism design分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
刘海,彭长根,田有亮,吕桢,刘荣飞..（2，2）贝叶斯理性秘密共享方案[J].电子学报,2014,(12):2481-2488,8.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目（No．60963023，No．61262073，No．61363068）；贵州省自然科学基金项目（No．20092113，No．20132112）；贵州大学引进人才科研项目（No ．2012024）；贵州大学研究生创新基金资助项目 （）
