东南大学学报（英文版）Issue(3)：374-379,6.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2014.03.022
不完美定向广告的两阶段竞争模型
Imperfect targeted advertising with two-period competition
摘要
Abstract
A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market.In the first period two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device.The firms’optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that under imperfect targeting when the advertising cost is low enough both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals’old segments.This equilibrium which could not exist under perfect targeting results in two opposite results.When cost is high the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits on the contrary when cost is low enough it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis-targeting degree.关键词
定向广告/不完美定向/价格歧视/两阶段博弈Key words
targeted advertising/imperfect targeting/price discrimination/two-period game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
邹翔,仲伟俊,梅姝娥..不完美定向广告的两阶段竞争模型[J].东南大学学报（英文版）,2014,(3):374-379,6.基金项目
The National Natural Science Foundation of China No．71371050． （）
