工业工程Issue(5)：108-113,6.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2014.05.018
信息不对称下双渠道供应链服务合作激励机制研究
Service Cooperation Incentive Mechanism in a Dual-channel Supply Chain under Asymmetry Information
摘要
Abstract
Aiming to investigate the incentive mechanism for different service levels provided by the manu-facturer in a dual-channel supply chain , the decision models of service cooperation are developed using the principal-agent theory on the assumption that the manufacturer′s service demand is achieved by the retail-er.Then, the optimal fixed payments and the optimal profit-sharing ratios are obtained under symmetric in-formation and asymmetric information , in addition to influence analysis of asymmetric information on coop-eration performance .The conclusion implies that the manufacturer′s profit decreases under asymmetric in-formation , the retailer′s profit remains the same even when lower service level is provided .However , the system performance of the supply chain decreases .关键词
供应链/双渠道/差异化服务/激励机制Key words
supply chain/dual-channel/service differentiation/incentive mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈军,何圆,赖信..信息不对称下双渠道供应链服务合作激励机制研究[J].工业工程,2014,(5):108-113,6.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71301179）；教育部人文社科研究基金资助项目（13YJC630009）；现代物流重庆市重点实验室开放基金 （）
