工业工程Issue(6)：70-76,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2014.06.012
基于碳信息不对称的两级供应链谎报行为
Misreporting Based on Asymmetric Information of Carbon Emission and Carbon Price in a Two-echelon Supply Chain
摘要
Abstract
Under asymmetric carbon information between upstream and downstream enterprises , in order to study the optimal misreporting decision , the Stackelberg game theory is adopted to discuss a two-echelon supply chain led by a manufacturer .A new production model is established based on carbon emission trading mechanism , and the optimal operation decisions of supply chain participants are obtained through the converse solution method .Besides , both the manufacturer and the retailer ’ s misreporting behavior and their influences on supply chain performance are discussed by a qualitative analysis .The results imply that there are big differences between carbon information misreporting and cost misreporting in supply chain . Manufacturer could seek his maximum profit whether he misreports or not .Compared with reflecting carbon information honestly , retailer prefers to under-report carbon information , and the misreporting of the retail-er will increase both the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer .However , the supply chain profits in misreporting situation are still lower than the optimal supply chain profits .The manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract , and the optimal revenue-sharing coefficient has positive correlation with retailer ’ s profits in misreporting situation .关键词
碳排放量/碳价格/不对称信息/谎报行为/收益共享契约Key words
carbon emission/carbon price/asymmetric information/misreporting/revenue sharing contract分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
杨磊,郑晨诗..基于碳信息不对称的两级供应链谎报行为[J].工业工程,2014,(6):70-76,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71101054）；华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目 （）
