工业技术经济Issue(7)：87-93,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2014.07.011
基于双寡头竞争回收的再制造商信息泄露机理研究
Research on Information Leakage Mechanism of Remanufacturer Based on Duopoly Recycling Competition
摘要
Abstract
We consider a two -echelon reverse supply chain composed of a remanufacturer and two third -party recyclers with recy-cling price competition and asymmetric cost information . Based on game theory , we analyze the optimal recycling pricing strategy for the remanufacturer and third-party recyclers under leaking information or not , and give the mechanism of information leakage of the remanu-facturer . The results are shown as follows . Under the high cost dominant recycler , the remanufacturer won't leak the dominant recycler's information to the follow recycler . Conversely , the remanufacturer's decision-making behavior of information leakage depends on the cog-nitive probability under the low cost dominant recycler .关键词
再制造/逆向供应链/信息泄露/回收定价Key words
remanufacturing/reverse supply chain/information leakage/recycling pricing分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
蹇明,陈志刚..基于双寡头竞争回收的再制造商信息泄露机理研究[J].工业技术经济,2014,(7):87-93,7.基金项目
国家社会科学基金资助项目（项目编号10CGL013）；中央高校基本科研业务费科技创新项目（项目编号SWJTU11CX079）。 （）
